By Lou Drendel
Equipped from 1954 to 1979, Douglas Skyhawk had an extended construction lifestyles than the other of the unfastened Worlds strive against plane and served because the ordinary gentle assault service airplane of the U.S. military for nearly two decades, supplying the majority of its awesome energy in the course of a lot of the Vietnam struggle.
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Additional info for A-4 Skyhawk
Roosevelt responded by in for ming Secretary of State Edwa rd R. , that " I still do not want to get A b d H I rnixed u p in any Indoc hina decision . ", nssn or IIr ey. lt is a matter for post-wa r. " He believed that "a n a rrangement had been made" between the two w ithou t the cogn izance of his predecessor, Lt. Ge n . Joseph W. Stil well 26 Despite the concern occaSionall y voiced by Ambassador Hurley and others, American cla n destine contacts and activities in Indochi na before the spring of 1945 had little or no effect on th e in tern al situation in Indochina or on Allied policy.
357 - 60; Thorne, "Indochi na and Anglo-American Relations," pp. 75 - 76; Raymond A. Whee ler to George C. Marshall, 24 Mar 45, O PD files; Lt Co l Henry G. Morgan, Planning the Defeat of Japan: A Study of Tota l Wa r Strategy, pp. 109 - 10, Ms in CMH . llHess, "Frank li n D. Rooseve lt ,1 nd Indochina," pp . 360 - 6 1; sec also Memo, Roosevelt for Under Seey of State (Ed ward R. ), 3 Nov 44, Departme nt of Stale, Foreigl1 Re/afiolls Of tile Ulli/ed States, '1944, vol. 3, The Britisll Commol1wealtll alld Ellrope (Washington, 1965), p.
4 The French also could help in rescui ng pilots shot d own over Indochina. In add itio n, it was wid ely believed that the Vietna mese-if not the Laotians and Ca mbod ians-were restive under th eir ja panese masters a nd that their services mig h t also be enlisted for vario us types of espionage and fifth-column ac ti vities. Although American commanders in China and India mad e no deliberate effort to contravene or circumvent Ame rican policy toward Indochina, that policy was sufficiently vague and am big uous to allow for a wide variety of in terpretations, and local commanders were seldom kept abreast of its latest twists and mod ifications.